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Abstract
Economic efficiency is a major argument for the inclusion of an international emission
permit trading system under the Kyoto Protocol. Using a partial equilibrium framework,
energy system models have shown that implementing tradable permits for greenhouse
gases internationally could reduce compliance costs associated with the emission targets.
However, we show that international emission trading could be welfare decreasing under
a general equilibrium framework. We describe a case of immiserizing growth in the sense
of Bhagwati where the negative terms of trade and tax-interaction effects wipe out the
primary income gains from emission trading. Immiserizing emission trading occurs only
when there are pre-existing distortions in the economy. Simulation results based on a
CGE model developed at MIT, the EPPA model, show that under an EU-wide emission
trading regime the introduction of a permit trading system cause welfare losses for some
of the trading countries.
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1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature in climate change economics assessing the
potential economic gains from emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol
(Weyant, 1999). This literature emphasizes that the aggregate economic
cost of achieving the Kyoto target might be reduced if marginal abatement
costs are equalized across countries. This result is consistent with textbooks
in environmental economics insisting on the cost-effectiveness of transferable
emission permit system and explaining that polluters have an incentive to
use the flexibility created by the system to achieve a given target at the
lowest possible cost (e.g. Tietenberg, 2000). Indeed, all pollutors are sup-
posed to gain from emission trading, whether sellers or buyers of permits,
compared to the case where permits are not freely transferable. The logic
appears irrefutable: why would parties freely enter a trade if they did not
gain? Indeed, the gains to all parties can be demonstrated graphically in a
simple partial equilibrium framework. And, empirically the economic bene-
fits of carbon emission trading have been verified with model-based analysis
using energy system models (e.g. Criqui et al., 1999; Gielen and Kram,
2000).
The conditions under which international permit trading would be intro-
duced, however, diverges from the standard environmental economics text-
book analysis in several important ways. In particular, in the case of in-
ternational permit trading we are interested in the impacts on a nation or
region whose economies may be subject to various economic distortions.
And, while not always clearly specified, the idea is that the traders are pri-
vate firms within the countries, rather than the countries themselves. Thus,
what may be beneficial to individual trading entities may not result in a
net benefit for the country. We draw on the general theory of second best
(Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), and the international trade literature on “im-
miserizing growth” started by Bhagwati (1958) to explain why, in the more
general case, all countries may not benefit from the introduction of a permit
trading system. Trade economists will immediately recognize that immis-
erizing growth can occur only when there are pre-existing distortions and
others will see this as an extension or application of the theory of the second
best. However, the possibility that emission permits trade might be welfare
decreasing in some cases seems not to have been generally appreciated in the
environmental economics literature, nor has its empirical importance been
explored for the case of carbon permit trading.
In section 2, we briefly present the general theories of second best and
immiserizing growth, and their relevance to international emissions trad-
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ing. Then, in section 3, we explain geometrically why international emission
trading might be a suboptimal policy in second best setting. Finally, we
present in section 4 simulation results based on a version of the MIT Emis-
sions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model that disaggregates nine
European countries. We focus the empirical analysis on introduction of a
permit trading system limited to trading within the European Union.
2 International emissions trading in a second best
setting
Different fuels are taxed at very different rates within almost all European
countries, and the same fuel is taxed at very different rates from one country
to another (Newbery 2001). Are energy taxes completely justified by the
internalization of environmental damages and the charge for road use? Ac-
cording to Newbery (2001), in most cases the taxes predate environmental
concerns, are not related in any systematic way to environmental damage,
and do not meet minimal criteria for so doing. Coal is almost invariably
the most environmentally damaging fuel, but it is usually the least heavily
taxed, and in many countries its production is heavily subsidized. If road
fuel taxes can to a considerable extent be justified as road user charges,
there is little evidence that road taxes are set on the basis of charging the
long-run marginal cost of expanding roads (Newbery, 1992).
Since climate policy will be implemented under imperfections and distor-
tions in the energy markets, one might expect the general propositions of the
second best theory and the theory of trade policies to be valid for the anal-
ysis of markets for tradable emissions permits. Our general proposition is
that international emissions trading (IET) may be welfare decreasing when
primary gains from trading are outweighed by “secondary costs” associated
with pre-existing distortions and market imperfections. In this section, we
will focus on the efficiency costs of IET due to the “tax-interaction effect”
and the terms of trade effect.
2.1 The tax-interaction effect of IET
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) have shown that, generally, when one optimal
equilibrium condition is not satisfied, for whatever reason, all of the other
equilibrium conditions will change. Thus if one market does not clear, it
would no longer be optimal for firms to set price equal to marginal cost or for
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consumers to set the price ratio equal to the marginal rate of substitution.1
When imperfections or distortions are present, the standard policy pre-
scriptions to maximize national welfare in a first-best or non-distorted econ-
omy will no longer hold true. Also the implementation of what would be a
detrimental policy in a first-best world can become a beneficial policy when
implemented within a second-best world.
Applying the theory of the second-best in international trade theory,
Bhagwati (1971) provides a framework for understanding the welfare impli-
cations of trade policies in the presence of market distortions. He demon-
strates the result that trade policies can improve national welfare if they
occur in the presence of a market distortion and if they act to correct the
detrimental effects caused by the distortion. Bhagwati also shows that for
each distortion, it is possible to analyze the welfare ranking of all alternative
policies, from the first best optimal to the second best.
Recent studies have focused on the ranking of alternative environmental
policy instruments in a second best setting. It is shown that the presence
of distortionary taxes raises the costs of pollution abatement under each
policy instrument relative to its costs in a first-best world (e.g. Fullerton and
Metcalf, 1997; Goulder et al. 1998; Parry and Williams, 1999). In a first best
setting, the relative cost-effectiveness of different policies can be explained
fully in terms of the difference in primary costs, including the cost from
the “abatement effect” and the cost from the “output-substitution effect”.
In a second best setting, the gross efficiency cost of various environmental
policies comprise the primary costs and the cost impact of pre-existing taxes,
including the “tax-interaction effect”2 and the “revenue-recycling effect”3.
Usually, pre-existing distortionary taxes raise the costs of a given tax since
the tax interaction effect dominates the revenue-recycling effect.
1The general theorem for the second best optimum is formulated by Lipsey and Lan-
caster (1956) as below:
“[If] there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which
prevent the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable.”
2The tax-interaction effect has two components (Goulder et al., 1998): the policy
instrument increases the price of goods, implying an increase in the cost of consumption
and thus a reduction in the real wage. This reduces labor supply and produces a marginal
efficiency loss which equals the tax wedge between the gross and net wage multiplied by
the reduction in labor supply. In addition, the reduction in labor supply contributes to a
reduction in tax revenues.
3The revenue recycling effect corresponds to the efficiency gain from the reduction
in the rate of pre-existing distortionary tax obtained with the revenues raised from the
emissions tax (Goulder, 1995).
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Free trade in emission permits is a cost-effective solution in a first best
setting. However, in a second best world, one needs to take into account
efficiency loss due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. Selling emission per-
mits generates primary income gains but also may cause income losses due
to restructuring of production in the selling country. Since the post-trading
price of the permit is higher than the pre-trading price in the selling country,
emission trading raises the costs of producing output, increases the relative
price of consumption goods and reduces the real household wage. The selling
country might be worse off compared to the case where a uniform carbon tax
is implemented domestically if the efficiency costs from the “tax-interaction
effect” outweigh the primary income gains from emissions trading.
2.2 The terms of trade effect of IET
Bhagwati (1958) has underlined the paradoxical possibility of “immiseriz-
ing growth”, where a country finds that the growth induced deterioration
in its terms of trade that implies a sufficiently large loss of welfare to out-
weigh the primary income gain from growth. In the original Bhagwati case,
growth can be welfare decreasing when it occurs in a country with monopoly
power in trade, even if the country has an optimal tariff policy in the pre-
growth situation.4 In the Johnson case (1967), immiserizing growth can
arise without any monopoly power in trade if the country has a sub-optimal
tariff policy in the pre-growth situation. Bhagwati (1968) demonstrates that
immiserizing growth can arise under any kind of distortion, whether endoge-
nous (monopoly) or policy-imposed (e.g. distortionary wage differentials),
and showed that immiserizing growth is also possible when growth occurs
in a country with monopoly power under a distortionary tariff policy. The
general theory of immiserizing growth states that growth can be welfare
decreasing only if (1) the pre-growth situation departs from full optimality
and (2) if the distortion is not removed by a policy intervention (Bhagwati,
1969).5
4The necessary conditions for export-biased immiserizing growth (Bhagwati and
Brecher, 1982, Kindelberger and Lindert, 1978) are: (1) the country’s growth must be
biased toward the export sector, (2) the country must already be heavily dependent on
trade (so that the terms of trade effect is strong enough to offset the gains from higher
supply of exportable goods), (3) the rest of the world must have an inelastic offer curve
or growth of the export sector must decrease the production of the import sector at the
initial product-price ratio.
5The possibility of immiserizing growth has been expanded into a whole set of argu-
ments regarding the effect of policymaking in developing countries. For example, it is
recognized that trade liberalization, in the presence of foreign capital, may be immiseriz-
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The theorem on immiserizing growth applies to the case of international
emissions trading as well. One might define the pre-emissions trading sit-
uation as a state where countries reach their emissions targets through do-
mestic actions, i.e. economy-wide emissions trading systems. In the no dis-
tortion case, this situation is a suboptimal situation compared to the case
where emissions permits can be freely traded internationally. Since markets
for emission permits are imperfect, some countries will have higher marginal
abatement costs than the others. Competitiveness effects are expected in
that policy case. Countries with low abatement costs will gain a cost ad-
vantage (term of trade gains) compared to countries with high abatement
costs. This cost advantage disappears when emissions permits are freely
traded across countries. IET may be immiserizing for a selling country if
the primary gains from permits selling are outweighed by the negative terms
of trade effect.6
3 Economic Impacts of IET
3.1 Gains from Trading - The no Distortion Case
Many economists favor transferable emission permits because they rely on
market forces to seek out the least cost reductions, and require no knowledge
on the part of the control authority with respect to where these least costly
abatement opportunities exist (Tietenberg, 2000). Rather, the main task of
the control authority is to issue the appropriate number of emission permits.
A cost-effective outcome can be achieved in the market regardless of the
initial distribution of permits (Knight, 1924; Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968). In
fact, a tradable permit system allows the policy maker to effectively separate
efficiency and equity issues, allocating permits on the basis of equity, or
ing (Bhagwati 1973; Bhagwati and Tironi, 1980). Based on this logic, it is also affirmed
that foreign aid and domestic capital should be channeled away from the exporting sectors
(e.g. agricultural or mineral productions) into industry (Bhagwati and Brecher, 1982).
6This adverse terms of trade effect of permits trading has been emphasized elsewhere.
Using a CGE model of the world economy featuring 7 sectors and 23 regions (15 of which
are EU member states), Bo¨hringer (2002) finds that some countries (i.e. Austria, Germany
and France) may suffer from a terms-of-trade loss as compared to the no trading case.
According to the author, “their gains in competitiveness with respect to energy-intensive
production vanishes with equalized marginal abatement costs across EU countries, which
is not offset by permit sales”. According to him, “the transition from purely domestic
action to a comprehensive trading system does not provide a Pareto-improvement because
countries with low marginal abatement costs may lose initial cost advantages (terms-of-
trade gains) under the no-trade case that are not offset by additional income from permits
sales” (p. 530).
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perhaps as an incentive for political support of the control policy, and letting
the permit market seek out where the most cost-effective reductions can be
achieved.
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Figure 1: Cost-effectiveness of international emissions trading
It is easy to demonstrate graphically the cost-effectiveness of interna-
tional emission trading when there are no distortions. Figure 1 is drawn
by measuring the marginal cost of emission reduction for country 1 (MAC 1)
and country 2 (MAC 2). In the initial situation, we assume that carbon
emissions are constrained in the two countries, so that emissions have to
be reduced (without emission trading) by Q,where Q is a paired reduction
target for the two countries (Q1, Q2) such that Q1 + Q2 = Q, and where
Q1 = Q2. As shown, the marginal abatement cost of emission reductions at
Q are higher in country 1 than in country 2 (P1 > P2).
Now, let’s assume that an international emission trading regime is imple-
mented, so that marginal abatement costs can be equalized across the two
countries. As shown in Figure 1, the optimal reduction levels in the two
countries are given by quantity pair labeled Q∗ and the marginal abatement
costs (or carbon prices) P ∗ in both regions. In that trading regime, coun-
try 1 reduces emissions by Q1T and buy emission permits whereas country
2 reduces emissions by Q2T and sell permits. As shown in Figure 1, the
two countries are necessarily better off with international emission trading
compared to the no trading case. The net income gains are equal to area A
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for country 1 and to area B for country 2.
3.2 Emissions Trading - The Pre-existing Distortion Case
A recent literature in public finance is devoted to the analysis and measure
of the incremental welfare costs of raising extra revenues from an already
existing distorting tax (e.g. Browning, 1976; Ballard et al., 1985; Browning,
1987; Fullerton, 1991). The basic concepts of that literature can be used to
analyze IET in a second best setting.
According to Browning (1976), the marginal cost of public funds is de-
fined as the direct tax burden plus the marginal welfare cost produced in
acquiring the tax revenue. The marginal welfare cost is the ratio of the
change in total welfare cost to the change in tax revenue produced when
tax rates are varied in some specific way (Browning, 1985). The direct tax
burden is the direct cost per dollar of tax revenue. It corresponds to the
marginal cost of public funds with no distortions.7
In order to measure the welfare impact of international emission trading
in a second-best world, one might distinguish between the marginal abate-
ment cost in the first best setting (MACn), the marginal welfare cost of
emission reduction (MWC), and the marginal abatement cost in the pres-
ence of pre-existing distortions (MAC). Representing only the primary
costs of the carbon policy (direct tax burden), MACn is defined as ∂T/∂C,
where T is the total abatement cost in the no distortion case and C repre-
sents the abatement level. The marginal welfare cost (MWC) of emissions
reduction is the ratio of the change in total welfare cost to the change in
carbon abatement; ∂W/∂C where W is the total welfare cost of abatement.
MWC measures the secondary costs of pre-existing distortions, including
the tax-interaction effect and the terms of trade effect. MAC is equal to
the direct cost of abatement plus the marginal welfare cost of abatement
((∂T + ∂W )/∂C).8
7The marginal welfare cost per dollar of revenue is equal to ∂W/∂R where W is the
marginal welfare cost produced by a change in the tax rate and where R is the additional
revenue. The marginal cost of public funds is simply equal to (∂W/∂R)+1 when we assume
that the tax base did not change in response to a change in the tax rate (Browning, 1976).
The “marginal excess burden” (MEB) of taxation that measures the incremental welfare
costs of raising extra revenues from an already existing distorting tax is (∂W − ∂R)/∂R.
According to Fullerton (1991), no measure of MEB is really necessary. The “marginal cost
of funds” (MCF) is enough information to compare the distorting effects of different tax
changes.
8A comparable approach can be found in Bernard and Vielle (2001). The authors break
down the income effect into two components: (1) the pure cost of carbon taxation and (2)
the “distortion” cost of carbon taxation. The pure cost of carbon taxation is the income
8
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Figure 2: Impact of IET for the net buyer of permits
In Figure 2, we draw marginal abatement costs curves in the no distor-
tion case (MACn) and in the distortion case (MAC) for a given country.
In the reference case, we suppose that the country meets a reduction target
Qd through an economy-wide emission trading scheme but without interna-
tional emission trading. In that case, the marginal abatement cost associated
with this target is Pc. If we suppose the presence of distortionary taxation,
the marginal abatement cost of the domestic reduction is equal to Pd, with
Pd > Pc.
Now, let’s assume that emission permits can be traded internationally,
and that the international permits price is PI . In that context, domestic
emissions are reduced by Q∗ with Q∗ < Qd. As a net buyer of emission
permits, the firm will reduce its total cost of reduction by area A. At the
same time, a lower domestic effort to limit carbon emissions has the effect
of reducing secondary effects (tax-interaction effect and terms of trade ef-
fect) due to pre-existing taxation (area C+D). If we add add primary and
secondary gains, international emission trading is thus welfare improving for
the buyer country (area A+C+D).
change (in EV) produced by the carbon policy in a first-best world without distortions,
or in a second-best economy based on optimal taxation.
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Figure 3 shows that the situation may be very different for the seller
country. Lets assume that the country goes beyond its emissions target
in order to sell emission permits. In that case, domestic emissions reduc-
tion may increase from Qd to Q
∗. The total cost of the extra reduction is
then equal to area B and the trading gains for the firm are equal to area
A+C. However, this reduction has the effect of increasing secondary costs
associated with pre-existing taxes (area A+D), and the net welfare effect of
permits selling, λ, is equal to area C minus D. λ can be positive or negative
depending on the size of the distortions and the amount of permits traded.
When the two curves are close (i.e. the marginal distortion is small) and
the international price is such that a lot of permits are exported, λ can be
positive. In contrast, when the economy is highly distorted and the size of
the emissions trading market is rather limited, λ can be negative.
Reduction of emissions
P
r i c
e s
MAC
MAC n
Q d Q *
P d
P c
A
C
P *
B
D
Figure 3: Impact of IET for the net seller of permits
The institutional architecture of domestic and international emissions
trading regimes should be defined in the light of these results. The way do-
mestic trading systems and international markets will interact is not neutral.
Two institutional structures can be compared: 1) national governments al-
locate permits to legal entities and permits are freely tradable domestically
and internationally (option 1); 2) legal entities trade permits domestically
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and national governments trade internationally to establish compliance (op-
tion 2) (Kerr, 2000).
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Figure 4: Public versus private trading
Figure 4 is drawn by comparing the two institutional options. MACn
and MAC are depicted for two countries. The curves are plotted from the
left-hand axis for country 1 (MACn1 and MAC1) and from the right-hand
axis for country 2 (MACn2 andMAC2). In the initial situation, we assume
that carbon emissions are constrained in the two countries, so that emissions
have to be reduced by Q in each country (with Q1 = Q2), and that MACn
and MAC are lower in country 2 than in country 1.
When option 1 is implemented, trading units recognize only the primary
costs and so MACn are equalized across the two countries. As shown in
Figure 4, the optimal reduction is Q∗ and the permits price is P . In
that trading regime, trading gains are equal to area B+C for legal entities
in country 1 and to area A for legal entities in country 2. If we assume
distorted economies, the welfare impact of international trading would be
positive for country 1 (area B+C+D+E+F) and negative for country 2 (area
B+D).
When option 2 is implemented, and if we assume governments can eval-
uate the social cost and all of them will trade to optimize domestic welfare,
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then as constructed in Figure 4, the optimal reduction of emission will re-
main Q∗ in the two countries but the international permits price will be at
P ∗ (with P ∗ > P ). In that institutional framework, both countries will be
better off compared to the no-trade case. In our example, the welfare gains
will be equal to area F for country 1 and area E+C for country 2.
4 A General equilibrium analysis based on the
EPPA-EU model
4.1 The EPPA-EU model
The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive
dynamic multi-regional general equilibrium model of the world economy
that has been developed for analysis of climate change policy (see, for ex-
ample, Babiker et al., 2000a; Ellerman and Wing, 2000). Previous versions
of the model have been used extensively for this purpose (e.g., Jacoby et
al., 1997; Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Jacoby and Sue Wing, 1999; Reilly
et al., 1999). The current version of EPPA is built on a comprehensive
energy-economy data set (GTAP4-E)9 that accommodates a consistent rep-
resentation of energy markets in physical units as well as detailed accounts
of regional production and bilateral trade flows. The base year for the model
is 1995 and it is solved recursively at 5-year intervals. A full documentation
of EPPA is provided in Babiker et al. (2001).
In this paper, we use a new version of the model (EPPA-EU) including a
breakdown for the European Union. The reference case for Europe in EPPA-
EU is presented and compared with other economic models in Viguier et al.
(2001). The EPPA-EU model has also been used to analyze welfare impacts
of hybrid carbon policies in the European Union (Babiker et al., 2001).
EPPA-EU extends the current version of EPPA by bringing in a detailed
breakdown of the EU and incorporating industry and household transport
sectors for each region. The regional, sectoral, and factor aggregation shown
inTable 1, together with the substitution elasticities inTable 2, completely
specify the benchmark equilibrium.
The European Union is disaggregated into 9 countries and 1 region rep-
resenting the Rest of Europe (ROE). Four out of the 9 EU countries (France,
Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands) were aggregated together with ROE in
the GTAP4-E database. We disaggregated this region using data from the
9For description of the GTAP database see Hertel, 1997.
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GTAP-5 Pre-release that provides a complete disaggregation of the EU.10
To accomplish this task we developed an optimization algorithm that uses
the economic structure of these 4 countries in GTAP-5 Pre-release while
imposing the output, demand, and trade balances for their corresponding
aggregate region in GTAP4-E. This allowed us to leave unchanged all other
regions of the standard EPPA based on GTAP4-E.
We followed the methodology developed by Babiker et al. (2000b) for
the United States to break out transportation from EPPA’s OTHERIND
sector and to create a household supplied transportation sector (i.e. private
automobiles) in the EU. The basic approach for the TRANS sectors is to use
GTAP’s trade and transport sector that combines transport with trade mar-
gins in combination with data from Input-Output tables produced by the
European statistical office (Eurostat). These tables provide the data to dis-
aggregate trade margins from transportation for each European country. For
the other regions in the model, we used the US input-output coefficients from
Babiker et al. (2000b) study. We have also made adjustments directly to
the Household (H) sector to represent own-supplied transportation services,
primarily those provided by personal automobiles. We used consumption
expenditure of private households reported by Eurostat (1999) and energy
prices and taxes from the International Energy Agency (IEA, 1998a; IEA,
1998b; IEA, 2000) along with the coefficients reported in the Babiker et al.
(2000b) study were used to separate the household purchases that are part
of household production of transportation from other household purchases.
The new breakout yields a sector of own-supplied personal transportation
(private automobiles) separate from other household activities, and a sep-
arate transportation sector in industry that supplies transport services to
both industry (i.e., freight transportation and any passenger transportation
purchased by business) and households (purchased transportation service,
mainly passenger transportation services such as air and rail service).
10Though GTAP-5 Pre-release has all 9 of these countries broken out we chose to focus
on disaggregating only the 4 largest of these countries.
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Production Sectors Name Countries and Regions Name 
    Non-Energy      Annex B  
1. Agriculture AGRI United States USA 
2. Energy-Intensive Industries EINT Japan JPN 
3. Other Industries and Services OIND Europe EEC 
4. Transportation TRAN Denmark DNK 
    Energy  Finland FIN 
5. Crude Oil OIL France FR 
6. Natural Gas GAS Germany DEU 
7. Refined Oil REFOIL Italy ITA 
8. Coal COAL Netherlands NLD 
9. Electricity ELEC Spain ESP 
    Future Energy Supply  Sweden SWE 
10. Carbon Liquids  United Kingdom GBR 
11. Carbon-Free Electric  Rest of EUa ROE 
  Other OECD OOE 
Households (Consumers) Sector H Former Soviet Union FSU 
  Central European Associates EET 
Primary Factors      Non-Annex B  
1. Labor L Brazil BRA 
2. Capital K China CHN 
3. Fixed Factors for Fuel and Agriculture  India IND 
  Energy Exporting Countries EEX 
  Dynamic Asian Economies DAE 
  Rest of World ROW 
a Includes Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, and Portugal.
Table 1: Dimensions of the EPPA-EU model
Parameter Description Value 
!ERVA Elasticity of substitution between energy resource composite & value-added (agriculture 
only) 
0.6 
!ER Substitution between land and energy-material bundle (agriculture only) 0.6 
!AE Substitution between energy and material composite (agriculture only) 0.3 
!VA Substitution between labor & capital
a
 " 
!ENOE Substitution between electric and non electric energy 0.5 
!EN Substitution among non-electric energy
b
 " 
!GR Substitution between fixed factor and the rest of inputs 0.6 
!EVA Substitution between energy and value added composite
c
 0.4 
!DM Armington substitution between domestic and imports
d
 3 
!MM Armington substitution across imports:     Non energy goods: 5.0 
                                                                     Energy goods:
e
 4.0 
!CS Temporal substitution between consumption and saving " 
!C Substitution across consumption goods
f
  
G0 Labor supply annual growth rate in efficiency units:  Developed countries: "-3% 
                                                                                      Developing countries: 2.5-
6% 
a Except nuclear in which it is 0.5. 
b Except for electricity where coal and oil generation substitute at 0.3 among themselves and at ".0 with gas. 
c
 Except energy intensive and other industry where it is 0.5. 
d
 Except Electricity where it is 0.3. 
e
 Except refined oil (6) and electricity (0.5). 
f
 Varies across countries and is updated with income recursively to reflect income elasticities based on an 
econometrically estimated equation. See Babiker et al. (200") for details. 
 
Table 2: Model parameters
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4.2 A Simple Approach to Welfare Decomposition
Building on the conventional Hicks and Slutsky partial equilibrium decom-
position analysis of a price change into income and substitution effects, we
extend the approach to the carbon policy and the general equilibrium con-
text. Under general equilibrium the welfare effect of a carbon constraint is
channelled through income and prices. The imposition of a carbon policy
raises production costs and consumer prices (depending on the carbon inten-
sities of the produced and/or consumed goods), and thereby induces changes
in welfare. Also, by raising production costs, carbon policy causes output
and income losses, which affect consumption and thereby welfare. Emission
trading is thought, by equating marginal costs, to reduce the welfare costs
of any given carbon policy. Whether this is always true, however, depends
on the effects of equating marginal costs on incomes and consumer relative
prices. Thus a welfare decomposition of these effects helps to explain when
and why a country may benefit or lose from emission trading, and to trace
back the sources of these benefits or losses.
Ignoring the environmental benefits from emission reductions, we define
the indirect welfare function as:
W =W (P (carbon),M(carbon)) (1)
where P is the consumer price vector and M is income, and where we use
“carbon” to indicate the carbon policy regime. The effect of an infinitesimal
change in the carbon policy regime on welfare at values M and P is then:
dW
dcarbon
=
∑
i
∂W
∂pi
∂pi
∂carbon
|M + ∂W
∂M
∂M
∂carbon
|P (2)
where i refers to the consumption goods. The first term on the right hand
side is then the price effect and the second term is the income effect. For a
large change in the carbon policy regime such as moving from national caps
to international permit trading the decomposition may be approximated as:
4W ≈
∑
i
∂W
∂pi
4pi|M + ∂W
∂M
4M |P (3)
where we have assumed linearity in the welfare response to prices and in-
come. In addition to linearity, two further problems with the above for-
mulation in the general equilibrium context are the interdependence among
prices (i.e. , substitutability and complementarities) and the joint determi-
nation of incomes and prices. The numerical method we develop allows us
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to test whether these assumptions are quantitatively important. We apply
this technique to decompose the welfare impacts of emission trading among
the EU member countries using the EPPA-EU model.
The method proceeds as follows. Utilizing the price-quantity duality in
the model, we use the unit expenditure function, which defines the consumer
price index (CPI), to summarize the price effect on welfare. Yet the challenge
is how to disentangle numerically the joint determination of income and
prices in the general equilibrium model. We do this by using simultaneously
two instruments, one to control the consumer price index and the other to
control income. The more general form of the welfare decomposition that
we use is thus:
4W ≈ 4W |M +4W |P (4)
where P here is the CPI or the unit expenditure index and where 4W is
the welfare after trading minus the welfare before trading. According to this
expression the change in welfare due to the introduction of emission trad-
ing is approximately equal to the welfare change due to changes in relative
prices only (the price effect) plus the welfare change due to change in income
only (the income effect). Numerically we compute one effect and obtain the
other by subtraction. To assess our handling of the non-linearity in the price
income relationship, we reverse the order and compute the other effect first
and then compare the results from the two procedures. After ensuring a
satisfactorily agreement in results, we use the procedure that fixes income
to do a further decomposition of the price effect into a pure domestic price
effect and a terms-of-trade effect. The extent to which the two estimates
differ indicates the accuracy of the decomposition approach; that is much
the empirical modeling diverges from the assumptions of linearity and inde-
pendence of the two effects. The results from applying the decomposition
technique are presented and explained in the results section.
4.3 Scenarios and results
In our simulations, we suppose that each Annex B country implements the
necessary policies to meet their Kyoto commitment by 2010.11 In addition,
the reallocation made by the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA) is applied
for European countries (Viguier, 2001). We also assume that Annex B
11The analysis examines only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Kyoto includes flexibility
to abate other greenhouse gases and to offset emissions with limited forest and land use
sinks for carbon, which are not considered here.
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countries outside the EU bubble meet their target only by domestic actions
(without international flexibility). Finally, no restriction is put on non-
Annex B countries.
The cases we construct to investigate the welfare effects of international
emission trading (by which we refer to trading among the EU member coun-
tries) are:
ETR: Economy-wide TRading where each EU country implement a full
domestic emission trading system but without trade across countries
(including pre-existing energy market distortions).
IETd: InternationalEmissionTrading where emission permits can be traded
across sectors within the European Union in the presence of pre-existing
distortions.
IETnd: International Emission Trading where emission permits can be
traded across sectors within the European Union, and where pre-existing
distortions (e.g. energy taxations) are removed (no distortion).
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Figure 5: Welfare effects of EU-wide emissions trading (in EV%)
Figure 5 illustrates welfare losses associated with the Kyoto constraint
when a uniform carbon tax is applied in each EU country (ETR case). Ac-
cording to the EPPA-EU model, welfare cost of Kyoto range from –0.7%
in France to over –5% in Netherlands. Figure 5 also shows the effect of
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implementing a EU-wide emission trading in the presence of existing en-
ergy taxes. Some countries, like Scandinavian countries or Spain (mainly
importers of carbon permits), would be better off with international trad-
ing whereas other, like the United Kingdom, Germany or France (mainly
exporters of carbon permits) are worse off with trading than without.
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Figure 6: EU-wide emission trading market, IETd case
Figure 6 depicts trade position of EU countries on the carbon market
under the IETd case. According to the EPPA-EU model, 25 MtC are ex-
pected to be traded in this carbon market by 2010. The estimated carbon
price for the EU bubble is around $175/tC. The United Kingdom, Germany,
France, Italy and the rest of Europe are projected to sell emission permits
to Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. If we compare the
welfare effects of international emission trading with trade positions, we can
see that net sellers of permits are those that are expected to be damaged
with international emission trading whereas net buyer of permits correspond
to winner countries.
Table 3 and Table 4 provide the decomposition of the welfare gains
from international emission trading in the context of Kyoto Agreement,
expressed in EV% points (i.e. EV% for case IETd minus EV% for case ETR)
for year 2010. According to our explanation in section 3.2, international
emission trading has a positive income effect and a negative price effect on
seller countries. In the presence of existing energy taxes, welfare is reduced in
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Income 
effect
Price 
effect
Total 
effect
Income 
effect
Price 
effect
Total 
effect
GBR 0.29 -0.80 -0.51 0.41 -0.92 -0.51
DEU 0.09 -0.23 -0.13 0.11 -0.25 -0.13
DNK -1.95 4.15 2.20 -2.05 4.25 2.20
SWE -1.06 2.90 1.84 -0.99 2.83 1.84
FIN -0.26 0.97 0.71 -0.28 1.00 0.71
FRA 0.09 -0.33 -0.24 0.06 -0.30 -0.24
ITA -0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13
NLD -1.09 3.33 2.23 -1.54 3.77 2.23
ESP -0.30 1.01 0.71 -0.40 1.12 0.71
REU -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.13
Method (B) control for the 
income effect 
Method (A) control for the 
price effect 
Table 3: Decomposition of welfare change from emission trading, IETd case
(in EV%)
Domestic 
price effect
Terms of 
trade effect
Total price 
effect
GBR -0.84 -0.08 -0.51
DEU -0.18 -0.06 -0.13
DNK 1.86 2.39 2.20
SWE 1.61 1.22 1.84
FIN -0.01 1.01 0.71
FRA -0.21 -0.10 -0.24
ITA -0.09 0.01 -0.13
NLD 3.31 0.46 2.23
ESP 1.24 -0.12 0.71
REU -0.01 -0.13 -0.13
Table 4: Decomposition of the price effect from emission trading, IETd case
(in EV%)
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all permit-exporting countries since income gains from international emission
trading are outweighed by the negative price effect. Conversely, international
emission trading is welfare increasing for permit-importing countries.
This example based on the EPPA-EU model demonstrates that interna-
tional emission trading could be welfare decreasing in some countries because
of general equilibrium effects. Despite the gains from trading, exporting
countries are worse off in this example because of the small size of permit
trade and because of the existing price structure, which involves already
very high energy taxes. In contrast, permit importing countries are better
off mainly because the welfare gains from reducing the carbon tax (through
permit trading) in the presence of the pre-existing energy tax system are
more than needed to compensate the welfare loss due to giving away money
in exchange for permits.
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Figure 7: Welfare effects of EU-wide emission trading with and without
pre-existing distortions (in EV%)
To further demonstrate that energy taxes are the distortions that lead to
losses from trading we conducted additional simulations where we removed
existing energy taxes in the EPPA-EU model. As shown in Figure 7,
the distortionary effect of the carbon constraint is reduced when existing
taxations are removed. On one side, welfare gains from emission trading
are more limited in importing countries in the IETnd case, compared to the
IETd case. On the other side, most of permit-exporting countries become
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Income Effect Price effect Total effect
GBR 0.0350 -0.0324 0.0026
DEU 0.0072 -0.0067 0.0005
DNK -0.0773 0.0873 0.0100
SWE -0.0757 0.0987 0.0230
FIN -0.0115 0.0126 0.0011
FRA 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0003
ITA -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0003
NLD -0.0568 0.0666 0.0098
ESP -0.0018 0.0020 0.0002
REU -0.0085 0.0082 -0.0003
Table 5: Decomposition of welfare change from emission trading, IETnd
case (in EV%)
better off with international emission trading.
Table 5 presents the decomposition of welfare gains from emission trad-
ing when existing taxes are removed, expressed in EV% units for year 2010.
In general, the direction of the income and price effects is the same as in
the case of distortions shown in Table 3. However, the magnitude of these
effects is significantly different. In particular removing existing taxes has
greatly alleviated the welfare burden of the incremental carbon tax (caused
by trading), and as a result we see the positive income effect offsets the
negative price effect leading to a net welfare gain for all exporting countries,
except France. In the importing countries, on the other hand, the positive
price effect still dominates the negative income effect but net welfare gains
are reduced (except in Italy and Rest of Europe).
5 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that international emissions trading can be welfare de-
creasing because of general equilibrium effects when there are distortions. It
occurs in countries exporting emission permits when efficiency costs associ-
ated with pre-existing distortionary taxes are larger than the primary gains
from emission trading. The case can arise because (1) energy markets are
already highly distorted in the European Union, and (2) EU countries are
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heavily dependent on trade. It means that the tax-interaction effect and the
drop in the terms of trade can be great enough to offset the direct income
gains from emissions trading. Note that the adverse effect of trading occurs
in countries which gained a comparative advantage from the absence of free
trade in carbon emission permits.
The adverse effects of emission permits in exporting countries are largely
explained by the presence of sub-optimal taxations in the pre-trade situa-
tion. When pre-existing distortions are removed, most of European coun-
tries exporting permits are better off when an international emission trading
regime is implemented. Thus, our analysis highlights the interaction of pre-
existing energy taxes and the Kyoto regime. The implementation of Kyoto
by economy-wide carbon taxes tend to create high distortions and dead-
weight losses in Europe because of existing energy taxation. We find that
an EU-wide emissions trading regime in the presence of existing energy taxes
is immiserizing for permit-exporting countries.
A critical aspect of our conclusions is that existing energy taxes are
viewed as pure distortions. Of course some taxes may be justified if they in-
ternalize other externalities, environmental or not. However, can we assume
energy taxes in Europe are set at levels that optimally correct externalities?
Probably not if we accept the analyses that have found little connection
between fuel tax levels and externalities. Thus, a carbon emissions trading
system could easily be welfare worsening in the EU. In this respect, the EC
proposal to limit the possibility to trade across Europe to energy compa-
nies and energy-intensive industries, and by this way to exclude the more
distorted sectors from the trading market is probably a good one. Another
policy option would be to let legal entities freely trade emission permits
domestically while limiting international trade to national governments in
hopes that government sponsored trades would reflect social costs.
The first best solution is to remove the existing distortions. In the ab-
sence of a willingness to do that, these result show that it is possible for
a country to lose as a result of introducing international permit trading.
It may therefore be possible for a country to intervene in an international
trading system and improve its welfare. Perhaps more importantly, this may
help explain the political difficulties of introducing and sustaining an inter-
national permit trading system, and the interests expressed in government-
to-government trading instead of international firm-to-firm trading. In the
case we examined, and with existing distortions, no country had an eco-
nomic incentive to be a permit seller–clearly a market with no sellers, and
only buyers is not feasible. Thus, there does not appear to exist a coalition
of countries among those we examined where there is an economic incentive
22
to have a trading system, absent a set of side-payments from those who
would gain from trading to those who would lose.
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